{"product_id":"conceptual-link-from-physical-to-mental-9780199669417","title":"Conceptual Link from Physical to Mental","description":"\u003cp\u003e • Author(s): Robert Kirk\u003cbr\u003e • Publisher: Oxford University Press (UK)\u003cbr\u003e • Publisher Imprint: Oxford University Press (UK)\u003cbr\u003e • BISAC: Cognitive Psychology \u0026amp; Cognition\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eHow are truths about physical and mental states related? Physicalism entails that non-physical truths are redescriptions of a world specifiable in narrowly physical terms. In The Conceptual Link from Physical to Mental Robert Kirk argues that physicalists must therefore hold that the physical truth \"logico-conceptually\" entails the mental truth: it is impossible for broadly logical and conceptual reasons that the former should have held without the latter. \"Redescriptive physicalism\" is a fresh approach to the physical-to-mental connection that he bases on these ideas. Contrary to what might have been expected, this connection does not depend on analytic truths: there are holistic but non-analytic conceptual links, explicable by means of functionalism--which, he argues, physicalism entails. Redescriptive physicalism should not be confused with \"a priori physicalism\" although physicalists must maintain that phenomenal truths are logico-conceptually entailed by physical truths, they must deny that they are also entailed a priori. Kripke-inspired \"a posteriori physicalism,\" on the other hand, is too weak for physicalism, and the psycho-physical identity thesis is not sufficient for it. Though non-reductive, redescriptive physicalism is an excellent basis for dealing with the problems that mental causation raises for other non-reductive views. \"Cartesian intuitions\" of zombies and transposed qualia may seem to raise irresistible objections; Kirk shows that the intuitions are false. As to the \"explanatory gap,\" there is certainly an epistemic gap, but it has a physicalistically acceptable explanation which deals effectively with the problem of how the physical and functional facts fix particular phenomenal facts.\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Oxford University Press (UK)","offers":[{"title":"Hardcover","offer_id":47597417791639,"sku":"9780199669417","price":8031.0,"currency_code":"INR","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0666\/3471\/1191\/files\/9780199669417.webp?v=1774997323","url":"https:\/\/atlanticbooks.com\/products\/conceptual-link-from-physical-to-mental-9780199669417","provider":"Atlantic Books","version":"1.0","type":"link"}