{"product_id":"doing-and-being-an-interpretation-of-aristotles-metaphysics-theta-9780199652044","title":"Doing and Being: An Interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta","description":"\u003cp\u003e • Author(s): Jonathan Beere\u003cbr\u003e • Publisher: OUP Oxford\u003cbr\u003e • Publisher Imprint: OUP Oxford\u003cbr\u003e • BISAC: History \u0026amp; Surveys - Ancient \u0026amp; Classical\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eDoing and Being \u003c\/em\u003econfronts the problem of how to understand two central concepts of Aristotle's philosophy: \u003cem\u003eenergeia \u003c\/em\u003eand \u003cem\u003edunamis\u003c\/em\u003e. While these terms seem ambiguous between actuality\/potentiality and activity\/capacity, Aristotle did not intend them to be so. Through a careful and detailed reading of \u003cem\u003eMetaphysics \u003c\/em\u003eTheta, Beere argues that we can solve the problem by rejecting both \"actuality\" and \"activity\" as translations of \u003cem\u003eenergeia\u003c\/em\u003e, and by working out an analogical conception of \u003cem\u003eenergeia\u003c\/em\u003e. This approach enables Beere to discern a hitherto unnoticed connection between Plato's \u003cem\u003eSophist \u003c\/em\u003eand Aristotle's \u003cem\u003eMetaphysics \u003c\/em\u003eTheta, and to give satisfying interpretations of the major claims that Aristotle makes in \u003cem\u003eMetaphysics \u003c\/em\u003eTheta, the claim that \u003cem\u003eenergeia \u003c\/em\u003eis prior in being to capacity (Theta 8) and the claim that any eternal principle must be perfectly good (Theta 9).\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"OUP Oxford","offers":[{"title":"Paperback","offer_id":47597921403031,"sku":"9780199652044","price":4555.0,"currency_code":"INR","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0666\/3471\/1191\/files\/9780199652044.webp?v=1774999047","url":"https:\/\/atlanticbooks.com\/products\/doing-and-being-an-interpretation-of-aristotles-metaphysics-theta-9780199652044","provider":"Atlantic Books","version":"1.0","type":"link"}