{"product_id":"doing-the-best-we-can-an-essay-in-informal-deontic-logic-9789027721648","title":"Doing the Best We Can: An Essay in Informal Deontic Logic","description":"\u003cp\u003e • Author(s): Fred Feldman\u003cbr\u003e • Publisher: Springer\u003cbr\u003e • Publisher Imprint: Springer\u003cbr\u003e • BISAC: Ethics \u0026amp; Moral Philosophy\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSeveral years ago I came across a marvelous little paper in which Hector-Neri Castaneda shows that standard versions of act utilitarian- l ism are formally incoherent. I was intrigued by his argument. It had long seemed to me that I had a firm grasp on act utilitarianism. Indeed, it had often seemed to me that it was the clearest and most attractive of normative theories. Yet here was a simple and relatively uncontrover- sial argument that showed, with only some trivial assumptions, that the doctrine is virtually unintelligible. The gist of Castaneda's argument is this: suppose we understand act utilitarianism to be the view that an act is obligatory if and only if its utility exceeds that of each alternative. Suppose it is obligatory for a certain person to perform an act with two parts - we can call it 'A \u0026amp; B'. Then, obviously enough, it is also obligatory for this person to perform the parts, A and B. If act utilitarianism were true, we appar- ently could infer that the utility of A \u0026amp; B is higher than that of A, and higher than that of B (because A \u0026amp; B is obligatory, and the other acts are alternatives to A \u0026amp; B).\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Springer","offers":[{"title":"Hardcover","offer_id":47592068710551,"sku":"9789027721648","price":7345.0,"currency_code":"INR","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0666\/3471\/1191\/files\/9789027721648.webp?v=1774975999","url":"https:\/\/atlanticbooks.com\/products\/doing-the-best-we-can-an-essay-in-informal-deontic-logic-9789027721648","provider":"Atlantic Books","version":"1.0","type":"link"}