{"product_id":"humes-problem-solved-the-optimality-of-meta-induction-9780262039727","title":"Hume's Problem Solved: The Optimality of Meta-Induction","description":"\u003cp\u003e • Author(s): Gerhard Schurz\u003cbr\u003e • Publisher: The MIT Press\u003cbr\u003e • Publisher Imprint: The MIT Press\u003cbr\u003e • BISAC: Epistemology\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"a-text-bold\"\u003eA new approach to Hume's problem of induction that justifies the optimality of induction at the level of meta-induction.\u003c\/span\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eHume's problem of justifying induction has been among epistemology's greatest challenges for centuries. In this book, Gerhard Schurz proposes a new approach to Hume's problem. Acknowledging the force of Hume's arguments against the possibility of a noncircular justification of the reliability of induction, Schurz demonstrates instead the possibility of a noncircular justification of the optimality of induction, or, more precisely, of meta-induction (the application of induction to competing prediction models). Drawing on discoveries in computational learning theory, Schurz demonstrates that a regret-based learning strategy, attractivity-weighted meta-induction, is predictively optimal in all possible worlds among all prediction methods accessible to the epistemic agent. Moreover, the a priori justification of meta-induction generates a noncircular a posteriori justification of object induction. Taken together, these two results provide a noncircular solution to Hume's problem.\u003c\/span\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSchurz discusses the philosophical debate on the problem of induction, addressing all major attempts at a solution to Hume's problem and describing their shortcomings; presents a series of theorems, accompanied by a description of computer simulations illustrating the content of these theorems (with proofs presented in a mathematical appendix); and defends, refines, and applies core insights regarding the optimality of meta-induction, explaining applications in neighboring disciplines including forecasting sciences, cognitive science, social epistemology, and generalized evolution theory. Finally, Schurz generalizes the method of optimality-based justification to a new strategy of justification in epistemology, arguing that optimality justifications can avoid the problems of justificatory circularity and regress.\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/span\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"The MIT Press","offers":[{"title":"Hardcover","offer_id":45268914471063,"sku":"9780262039727","price":3885.0,"currency_code":"INR","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0666\/3471\/1191\/files\/9780262039727.webp?v=1769236785","url":"https:\/\/atlanticbooks.com\/products\/humes-problem-solved-the-optimality-of-meta-induction-9780262039727","provider":"Atlantic Books","version":"1.0","type":"link"}