{"product_id":"oligopoly-pricing-old-ideas-and-new-tools-9780262720403","title":"Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools","description":"\u003cp\u003e • Author(s): Xavier Vives\u003cbr\u003e • Publisher: MIT Press\u003cbr\u003e • Publisher Imprint: MIT Press\u003cbr\u003e • BISAC: Finance - General\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe \"oligopoly problem\"--the question of how prices are formed when the market contains only a few competitors--is one of the more persistent problems in the history of economic thought. In this book Xavier Vives applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. Vives begins by relating classic contributions to the field--including those of Cournot, Bertrand, Edgeworth, Chamberlin, and Robinson--to modern game theory. In his discussion of basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, he pays particular attention to recent developments in the theory of supermodular games. The middle section of the book, an in-depth treatment of classic static models, provides specialized existence results, characterizations of equilibria, extensions to large markets, and an analysis of comparative statics with a view toward applied work. The final chapters examine commitment issues, entry, information transmission, and collusion using a variety of tools: two-stage games, the modeling of competition under asymmetric information and mechanism design theory, and the theory of repeated and dynamic games, including Markov perfect equilibrium and differential games.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"MIT Press","offers":[{"title":"Paperback","offer_id":47614345674903,"sku":"9780262720403","price":6808.0,"currency_code":"INR","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0666\/3471\/1191\/files\/9780262720403.webp?v=1775092839","url":"https:\/\/atlanticbooks.com\/products\/oligopoly-pricing-old-ideas-and-new-tools-9780262720403","provider":"Atlantic Books","version":"1.0","type":"link"}