{"product_id":"reasons-why-9780198785842","title":"Reasons Why","description":"\u003cp\u003e • Author(s): Bradford Skow\u003cbr\u003e • Publisher: Oxford University Press\u003cbr\u003e • Publisher Imprint: Oxford University Press\u003cbr\u003e • BISAC: Logic\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eReasons Why\u003c\/em\u003e first argues that what philosophers are really after, or at least should be after, when they seek a theory of explanation, is a theory of answers to why-questions. It then advances a thesis about what form a theory of answers to why-questions should take: a theory of answers to why-questions should say what it takes for one fact to be a reason why another fact obtains. The book's main thesis, then, is a theory of reasons why. Every reason why some event happened is either a cause, or a ground, of that event. Challenging this thesis are many examples philosophers have thought they have found of \"non-causal explanations.\" \u003cem\u003eReasons Why\u003c\/em\u003e uses two ideas to show that these examples are not counterexamples to the theory it defends. First is the idea that not every part of a good response to a why-question is part of an answer to that why-question. Second is the idea that not every reason why something is a reason why an event happened is itself a reason why that event happened. In the book's final chapter its theory of reasons why is extended to cover teleological answers to why-questions, and answers to why-questions that give an agent's reason for acting.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Oxford University Press","offers":[{"title":"Hardcover","offer_id":47574321365143,"sku":"9780198785842","price":10973.0,"currency_code":"INR","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0666\/3471\/1191\/files\/9780198785842.webp?v=1774895149","url":"https:\/\/atlanticbooks.com\/products\/reasons-why-9780198785842","provider":"Atlantic Books","version":"1.0","type":"link"}