{"product_id":"seeing-doing-and-knowing-a-philosophical-theory-of-sense-perception-9780199204281","title":"Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception","description":"\u003cp\u003e • Author(s): Mohan Matthen\u003cbr\u003e • Publisher: OUP Oxford\u003cbr\u003e • Publisher Imprint: OUP Oxford\u003cbr\u003e • BISAC: Mind \u0026amp; Body\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSeeing, Doing, and Knowing\u003c\/em\u003e is an original and comprehensive philosophical treatment of sense perception as it is currently investigated by cognitive neuroscientists. Its central theme is the task-oriented specialization of sensory systems across the biological domain. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003eSensory systems are automatic sorting machines; they engage in a process of classification. Human vision sorts and orders external objects in terms of a specialized, proprietary scheme of categories -- colors, shapes, speeds and directions of movement, etc. This \"Sensory Classification Thesis\" implies that sensation is not a naturally caused image from which an organism must infer the state of the world beyond; it is more like an internal communication, a signal concerning the state of the world issued by a sensory system, in accordance with internal conventions, for the use of an organism's other systems. This is why sensory states are both easily understood and persuasive. \u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003eSensory classification schemes are purpose-built to serve the knowledge-gathering and pragmatic needs of particular types of organisms. They are specialized: a bee or a bird does not see exactly what a human does. The Sensory Classification Thesis helps clarify this specialization in perceptual content and supports a new form of realism about the deliverances of sensation: \"Pluralistic Realism\" is based on the idea that sensory systems coevolve with an organism's other systems; they are not simply molded to the external world. \u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003eThe last part of the book deals with reference in vision. Cognitive scientists now believe that vision guides the limbs by means of a subsystem that links up with the objects of physical manipulation in ways that bypass sensory categories. In a novel extension of this theory, Matthen argues that \"motion-guiding vision\" is integrated with sensory classification in conscious vision. This accounts for the quasi-demonstrative form of visual states: \"This particular object is red\", and so on. He uses this idea to cast new light on the nature of perceptual objects, pictorial representation, and the visual representation of space.","brand":"OUP Oxford","offers":[{"title":"Paperback","offer_id":47586304884887,"sku":"9780199204281","price":5691.0,"currency_code":"INR","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0666\/3471\/1191\/files\/9780199204281.webp?v=1774963557","url":"https:\/\/atlanticbooks.com\/products\/seeing-doing-and-knowing-a-philosophical-theory-of-sense-perception-9780199204281","provider":"Atlantic Books","version":"1.0","type":"link"}