{"product_id":"strategic-social-choice-stable-representations-of-constitutions-9783642138744","title":"Strategic Social Choice: Stable Representations of Constitutions","description":"\u003cp\u003e • Author(s): Bezalel Peleg\u003cbr\u003e • Publisher: Springer\u003cbr\u003e • Publisher Imprint: Springer\u003cbr\u003e • BISAC: Economics - Theory\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFrom the Back Cover\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThis monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Springer","offers":[{"title":"Hardcover","offer_id":45279821955223,"sku":"9783642138744","price":8079.0,"currency_code":"INR","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0666\/3471\/1191\/files\/9783642138744.webp?v=1769294647","url":"https:\/\/atlanticbooks.com\/products\/strategic-social-choice-stable-representations-of-constitutions-9783642138744","provider":"Atlantic Books","version":"1.0","type":"link"}