{"product_id":"the-japanese-central-banking-system-compared-with-its-european-and-american-counterparts-a-new-institutional-economics-approach-9789811390036","title":"The Japanese Central Banking System Compared with Its European and American Counterparts: A New Institutional Economics Approach","description":"\u003cp\u003e • Author(s): Yoshiharu Oritani\u003cbr\u003e • Publisher: Springer\u003cbr\u003e • Publisher Imprint: Springer\u003cbr\u003e • BISAC: Economic History\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eForeword\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePreface\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAcknowledgements\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1 Rationale of Central Banks\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.1 Overview\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.2 Earlier Studies\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.2.1 Bagehot's Study\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.2.2 Sayers' Study\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.2.3 Smith's Study\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.2.4 Hayek's Study\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.3 Three Types of Banking Systems and Three Modes of Economic Systems\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.3.1 Three Types of Banking Systems\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.3.2 Examples of Type Change from Type A to Type C in Japan and the US\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.3.3 Three Modes of Economic Systems\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.3.4 Transaction Costs and Modes of Economic Systems\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.3.5 Asset Specificity and Modes of Economic Systems\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.4 Analysis of Transaction Costs in Interbank Transactions\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.4.1 Methodology\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.4.2 Transaction Costs of a Banking System with no Central Bank\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.4.3 Transaction Costs of a Banking System with Central Bank Only\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.4.4 Transaction Costs of a Banking System with Both Central Bank and Commercial Banks\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.5 Importance of Institutional Environment and Recent Changes\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.5.1 Institutional Environment and its Influence\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.5.2 Recent Major Changes in the Institutional Environment\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.6 Implications for Institutional Issues of Central Banks\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.6.1 Evolution of a Supranational Central Bank\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e 1.6.2 Bankers' Associations vs. Central Banks\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e 1.6.3 Central Bank as Supervisor\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e 1.6.4 Clients and Business Scope of Central Banks\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.7 Conclusion\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2 Governance Structure of Central Banks\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.1 Overview\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.2 Governance Structure Theory of New Institutional Economics\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.2.1 Williamson's Governance Structure Theory\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.2.2 Theory of Club Goods and Governance Structure of Club Organization\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.3 Application to Central Bank Governance Structure\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.3.1 Central Bank Services and Organizational Features\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e 2.3.2 Arguments on the Governance Structure of Central Banks\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.4 Designing a Central Bank Board Structure\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.4.1 Multiboard Structure\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.4.2 Examples of a Central Bank Multiboard Structure\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.5 Role of Capital Stock\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.5.1 Identifying Matters Related to Central Bank Capital Stock\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.5.2 Application of Williamson's Theory to Capital Stock\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.5.3 Central Bank Capital Stock from the Perspective of Organizational Culture Theory\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.6 Conclusion\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3 Public Governance of Central Banks\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e3.1 Overview\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e3.2 Application of Transaction Cost Economics\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e 3.2.1 Application of Williamson's Governance as Probity Hypothesis\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e3.2.2 Application of Moe's Theory on the Autonomy of a Bureaucratic Organization\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e3.3 Application of Agency Theory\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e 3.3.1 Agency Theory and the Political Process\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e 3.3.2 Features of the Principal-Agent Relationship of a Central Bank\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e 3.3.3 Congressional Dominance Hypothesis and the Central Bank\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e 3.3.4 Multiboard System of the Central Bank Based on Agency Theory\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e 3.3.5 Agency Problem of a Central Bank and Accountability\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e3.4 Application of Public Choice Theory\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026amp;nb\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Springer","offers":[{"title":"Paperback","offer_id":45283033579671,"sku":"9789811390036","price":8814.0,"currency_code":"INR","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0666\/3471\/1191\/files\/9789811390036.webp?v=1769303886","url":"https:\/\/atlanticbooks.com\/products\/the-japanese-central-banking-system-compared-with-its-european-and-american-counterparts-a-new-institutional-economics-approach-9789811390036","provider":"Atlantic Books","version":"1.0","type":"link"}