THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that analyze and discuss issues surrounding municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Volume 1 of the casebook covers the District of Columbia Circuit and the First through the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. * * * Title 42 U.S.C. 1983 provides in relevant part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]A municipality or other local government may be liable under 1983 if the governmental body itself "subjects" a person to a deprivation of rights or "causes" a person "to be subjected" to such deprivation. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). But, under 1983, local governments are responsible only for "their own illegal acts." Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 471 (1986) (emphasis in original) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 665-683). They are not vicariously liable under 1983 for their employees' actions. Id. at 478.Municipal liability under 1983 has three elements: (1) a policymaker; (2) an official policy; and (3) a violation of a constitutional right whose "moving force" is the policy or custom. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Requiring satisfaction of these elements is "necessary to distinguish individual violations perpetrated by local government employees from those that can be fairly identified as actions of the government itself." Id.An official policy "usually exists in the form of written policy statements, ordinances, or regulations, but may also arise in the form of a widespread practice that is 'so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.'" James v. Harris Cty., 577 F.3d 612, 617 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579). Whatever its form, to yield municipal liability under 1983, the policy must have been the "moving force" behind the plaintiff's constitutional violation. Piotrowski, 237 F. 3d at 580 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). In other words, a plaintiff "must show direct causation, i.e., that there was 'a direct causal link' between the policy and the violation." James, 577 F.3d at 617 (quoting Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 580). "Where an official policy or practice is unconstitutional on its face, it necessarily follows that a policymaker was not only aware of the specific policy, but was also aware that a constitutional violation [would] most likely occur." Burge v. St. Tammany Par., 336 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579). Covington v. City of Madisonville, (5th Cir. 2020)
